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A TRIBUTE TO MOHAMMAD
HIDAYATULLAH
My Own Boswell: Memoirs of M. Hidayatullah. MOHAMMAD
HIDAYATULLAH. AB/9 Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi, 110016,
India: Gulab Vazirani for Arnold-Heinemann Publishers (India)
Pvt. Limited, 1980. Pp. viii, 304 (including Appendices and Index).
85.00 Rupees (cloth).
Bertram F Willcox*
Judge Mohammad Hidayatullah lectured at the Cornell Law
School in 1975. I believe it was during that visit that he noticed, in
our library, and liked, Oliver Wendell Holmes's subtitle to the
Autocrat of the Breakfast Table: "Every Man His Own Boswell."
He adapted it, with a bow to Dr. Holmes, as the title for what was to
become his autobiography.
For anyone wanting an introduction to the legal world of
India-its atmosphere and its ways-or wanting a vividly readable
and entertaining account of the life of a great judge and quiet
statesman, there could be no more pleasant recommendation than
reading these Memoirs. The author is outstanding in that legal
world, genial and friendly and easy, but a benevolently powerful
jurist nonetheless. He has been advocate; Government Pleader; law
faculty member; law dean; Advocate General; High Court Judge
and Chief Justice; Supreme Court Judge and Chief Justice of India;
Acting President of India; and is now (since the book) the Vice
President of India.
Although his life's work lay chiefly in Indian law, Mr.
Hidayatullah has also been actively involved in international law as
a member of the International Law Association, the Executive
Council of the World Assembly of Judges, the International
Commission of Jurists, and finally, through his association with
World Peace Through World Law. Indeed, any jurist of Mr.
* McRoberts Research Professor in the Administration of the Law, Cornell Law
School. Professor Emeritus since 1963. Consultant on Legal Education for the Ford
Foundation and Visiting Professor at the Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, India (1963-
67); Visiting Professor at the Banaras Hindu University, Banaras, India (1965-66).
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Hidayatullah's scholarly bent, grappling with the complex warp and
woof of Indian laws-British common law, statutes, customary,
religious, and tribal laws-must work daily in what is almost an
international law to itself. His judgments (we call them opinions in
Anglo-American legal discourse) are constantly enriched .by
comparative references to the laws of many nations.
The Memoirs do not purport, of course, to expound the
substance or sources of Indian or other laws. Nor do they discuss at
any length India's history or its political problems.1 In the Memoirs,
Mr. Hidayatullah looks back from his seventies, and tells his story in
a kaleidoscopic whirl of short, good-humored chapters that leave the
reader somewhat breathless. The book is highly readable, with bits
of intense drama, triumphs, defeats and misadventures that at times
become hilarious-all recounted with good-natured gusto. Mr.
Hidayatullah's wry, mischievous humor sparkles on many pages.
There are occasional spots of hard going, particularly in the
discussions of points of law where the author too easily assumes his
reader's familiarity with the cases and personalities mentioned. But
most of the book is filled with the excitement, rivalries, failures and
accomplishments of the legal world of India, a system bequeathed by
British rulers and forced to adapt itself to the needs of India's vast
ethnic diversity and the concomitant legal complexities.
After completing his education at Trinity College, Cambridge,
Mr. Hidayatullah returned to India to start practice as an advocate
(barrister) in his native Nagpur, in 1930. The rigid British
distinction between solicitors who deal with clients and barristers
who represent clients in litigation before the court, however, does not
hold very generally in India. Another difference between practice in
India and practice in the United States is that law firms are scarce in
India. Hence, Mr. Hidayatullah began his practice in a manner
analogous to that of a new law graduate in the United States who
hangs out a shingle and tries to make himself or herself as attractive
as possible to clients. His early emphasis was on criminal law.
Although this was less remunerative than civil law-his first year's
fees totaled fifty rupees--criminal cases brought a quicker
recognition to the fledgling lawyer.
1. Mr. Hidayatullah's other writings range widely, and provide commentary on a
variety of such issues. See A JUDGE'S MISCELLANY, Third Series (1982); A JUDGE'S
MISCELLANY, Second Series (1979); A JUDGE'S MISCELLANY, First Series (1972); THE
CONSTITUTION: THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COURT (1972); JUDICIAL METHODS (1970);
MULLA'S MOHOMEDAN LAW 16th, 17th, and 18th Editions (M. Hidayatullah ed. 1968,
1972, 1977); THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CASE (1967); and DEMOCRACY IN INDIA AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1966). At present, he is Editor-in-Chief of a series of volumes
on Indian law along the lines of HALISBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, the first volume being
on Indian constitutional law.
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One of his early cases smacks of Perry Mason.2 The client was
charged with having killed a pedestrian while driving on a lonely
road. The truth was that the client had seen a body lying on the
road,'and had stopped his car to provide assistance. The pedestrian
was already dead. A Police Inspector, arriving at that moment,
arrested the client in the belief that his car had killed the victim.
Mr. Hidayatullah found no marks, nor any blood, on the client's
car. But he did find a piece of glass near the body, curved and large,
as if broken from the headlight of a bus or truck. The driver of the
offending vehicle had obviously gathered up the other pieces, but
had missed this one.
The nearest place for a headlight repair was Kamptee, a mile
away and accessible only via a small road and a guarded bridge
closed to trucks. The bridge watchman informed Mr. Hidayatullah
that a green truck had recently defied him by crossing that bridge
without permission. Getting the addresses of all motor-repair
garages in Kamptee, Mr. Hidayatullah struck pay dirt at his first
stop. The operator's bill-book yielded "the name of the driver (false)
and the number of the truck (true)." The real offender was arrested,
and the charge against the accused was dismissed.
Mr. Hidayatullah obviously studied hard in preparing his early
cases. And he must have studied people as well as books. In one
case, a railway clerk had, on May 19th (i.e., during one of the hottest
parts of the Indian year), stolen one bottle of beer from a shipment.3
He had been sentenced to a long prison term-a sentence that would
also cost him his job and his employment benefits. Mr. Hidayatullah
was to argue the appeal before a very stem British judge,
tempermental and crotchety and made more irritable by his
detestation of India's heat. The hearing was purposefully arranged
by Mr. Hidayatullah for the 19th of May, the anniversary of the
crime. The court room had no air-conditioning, and was sweltering
as the trial began. The judge commented that "Breaking bulk is a
serious matter." Mr. Hidayatullah noted that it was a hot day, and
that "Come to think of it the offense was last year on the 19th May."
The judge ruminated unhappily, and "kept repeating-It must have
been a hot day. . . ." As Mr. Hidayatullah relates the story, the
judge, quite transparently, was thinking how good that bottle of beer
would have tasted on such a day. Then suddenly the judge asked
whether a fine of 1000 rupees would do-the day, and the job, were
saved.
2. M. HIDAYATULLAH, My OWN BOSWELL: MEMOIRS OF M. HIDAYATULLAH 92-94
(1980) (hereinafter cited as Memoirs).
3. Id. at 74-75.
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In several of the cases recounted by Mr. Hidayatullah, legal
skills were complemented by incredible strokes of luck-luck that
makes one wonder whether it could have been pure blind chance. 4
In one of these,5 he was representing his own uncle, very nervously.
Opposing counsel was the most successful and the most feared of the
local practitioners. True to form, this antagonist produced a totally
unanticipated point of law, and supported it with a Calcutta ruling.
The presiding judge remarked that this point would be decisive
unless Mr. Hidayatullah could answer it. Mr. Hidayatullah begged
the court to proceed with the rest of the argument, and promised to
give a convincing reply thereafter, or to concede. The judge agreed,
stipulating that the reply should take no more than five minutes. At
intermission Mr. Hidayatullah rushed to the library. Colleagues had
mentioned to him a certain Privy Council case at a certain page in a
certain volume of the India Appeals "as possibly furnishing a reply."
By mistake, in his haste, he pulled out the wrong volume of the Privy
Council reports. "Believe it or not, I found at the page mentioned by
them a Privy Council case which was on all fours and furnished a
complete answer. The Calcutta case had not noticed it and had
taken a contrary view." He sent this volume to the clerk. When the
court reassembled, the presiding judge asked for the promised
answer. Mr. Hidayatullah said he would surrender three of his five
minutes, asking only that the court read two paragraphs of the Privy
Council case. "Have you seen this case?" the judge asked opposing
counsel. "I have seen it now" was the reply, "and have nothing
further to say."
'6
In addition to his practice as a rising young lawyer, Mr.
Hidayatullah became, after only four years at the Bar, a part-time
lecturer in law at Nagpur University. He continued in this post for
eight years (1934-1942). Law teaching in India was modeled on the
British system, consisting mainly of uninterrupted lectures, followed
by examinations. The "Socratic" or discussion method, which we in
the United States tend to think of as superior, was not used in India
for another quarter century. From our viewpoint, it seems surprising
that so many eminent practitioners and judges have been so well-
4. See, e.g., A. KOESTLER, ROOTS OF COINCIDENCE (1972).
5. Memoirs, supra note 2, at 81-82.
6. Id. at 82. Mr. Hidayatullah's accounts of his many legal battles, and my own
recollections of Indian law and law teaching as I touched them in the 1960's, spotlight
one major practical difference between legal research in India and the United States-the
inadequacy, by our standards, of India's library facilities. The refined tools for finding
and tracing points of law, to which we have grown accustomed in the United States, were
either rudimentary or non-existent in India. The high quality of the best Indian legal
research and writing is truly remarkable when one considers the paucity of the facilities
in so many Indian law libraries.
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trained by the British system, not only in India, but also in the rest of
the British Empire. Perhaps we legal educators should be less
adamant in our allegiance to the Socratic method in view of those
successes.
As Mr. Hidayatullah gained more recognition, he shifted his
emphasis to appellate work. He soon became, in spite of his youth, a
recognized leader of the Bar, and, as such, he was drawn into public
service. In 1942, he was appointed Government Pleader, but this
work lasted only nine months before he was made Advocate General
of the Province.
Among the exciting and important cases which he handled as
Advocate General, there was one that arose out of a series of riots
during which the Treasuries of several Provincial Governments were
looted.7 The Reserve Bank of India claimed that the Provincial
Governments, as bailees, were responsible for the loss of any of the
Reserve Bank's currency deposited with the Provincial Treasuries.
All the other Provincial Advocates General who were involved
conceded the Reserve Bank's claim. Mr. Hidayatullah, however, did
not concede. The case went to arbitration at Dehli. Exhaustive
study, completed only on the Delhi train, had combed the law of
bailments through Roman Law, Storey, Jones, as well as decided
cases as far back as Coggs v. ]Bernard.8 Mr. Hidayatullah and his
associates triumphantly overwhelmed the arguments of the over-
confident lawyers for the Reserve Bank, those based on absolute
liability as well as those based on negligence. The hopeless case had
been won! This victory naturally added to Mr. Hidayatullah's
national recognition.
After three years as Advocate General, Mr. Hidayatullah
became a Judge of the High Court at Nagpur for eight years (1946-
1954), and later its Chief Justice for two more years (1954-1956).
Madhya Pradesh, having become a State upon India's
Independence, was "vivisected" in 1956. Its administration was
divided between three cities, and the High Court was moved to
Jabalpur.
In 1958, Mr. Hidayatullah was surprised by a telephone call
from the Chief Justice of India, asking him to come to Dehli as a
Judge on the Supreme Court. Mr. Hidayatullah accepted the
invitation, and within one week took his oath of office. He was a
member of the Supreme Court for over twelve years, and for the last
two years of his tenure (1968-70) was India's Chief Justice.
7. Memoirs, supra note 2, at 111-16.
8. 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
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For thirty-five days during his Chief Justiceship, in 1969, he was
also the acting President of India. This came about because the
revered President Zakir Husain had died, and the Vice President, V.
V. Gir, had resigned in order to contest a forthcoming election for
the Presidency. Under Indian law, the Chief Justice was the next to
assume the office. After completing his temporary term as President,
Mr. Hidayatullah returned to his position as Chief Justice of India.
In late 1970, upon reaching the mandatory retirement age (65), he
retired from the Supreme Court.
To attempt a survey of Mr. Hidayatullah's great Supreme Court
cases would make this review too long and, in any case, would be
beyond my competence. I shall make a brief exception, however, for
what may be his most famous decision. It is certainly one of
worldwide importance for all nations living under constitutional
governments, and also one, perhaps, that may flash a warning to us.
A written constitution, of course, incorporates a society's
agreement on the why and how of government, stating *objectives,
apportioning powers, and setting forth procedures. The Indian
Constitution (1949)9 may be the world's longest and most intricate.
It was well researched and crafted, in general, by the Constituent
Assembly, but it suffered from one disastrous weakness: an apparent
invitation to hasty and misguided amendment. The Preamble to the
Constitution stresses its purpose of bringing justice, liberty and
equality to India,' 0 and a later part contains a bill of Fundamental
Rights that are protected by a power of the Supreme Court to annul
any law that infringes upon those rights." There also is a list of
humane Directive Principles which are not justiciable.1
2
The founding fathers evidently believed that the Federal
(bicameral) Parliament could be trusted with constituent power to
amend the Constitution. All that is required by the express language
of the Constitution is that a bill be passed in each House by the
normal voting majority-except that that majority must be not less
than two-thirds of the total membership of that House-and that the
amendment be approved by the President. In those cases affecting
the judiciary or the States, however, one-half of the States must also
ratify the -amendment.
Through this hole in the dikes, amendments immediately
commenced to pour. Most of these amendments attacked and
reversed particular interpretations of the Constitution by the
9. For the text of and amendments to the Indian Constitution, see VII Constitutions
of the Countries of the World, India, 1-207 (A. Blaustein and G. Flanz eds. 1981).
10. Id. at 1.
11. Id. arts. 12-35, at 4-15.
12. Id. arts. 36-51, at 15-18.
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Supreme Court. This flood continued for the better part of two
decades. With sparse dissents from Judge Hidayatullah and one
other Supreme Court Judge, the Court sanctioned these legislative
efforts, regardless of subject matter and in spite of the havoc some
wrought with the Constitution's carefully designed fabric.
Then, in 1967, came the case of Golaknath v. State of Punjab. 13
A Special Bench of eleven Supreme Court Judges sat for this case.
Five agreed with the earlier cases upholding all amendments; five
others disagreed, the opinion being written by Chief Justice Subba
Rao. Judge Hidayatullah concurred with Subba Rao, in a separate
opinion,' 4 thus exercising a swing vote in a decision which has been
momentous for India's constitutional history and for her future
prospects.
The six prevailing judges argued that although the article
concerning amendments set forth the procedure which must be
followed for a valid amendment, it did not thereby confer a plenary
power to amend in any way and on any and all subjects.
Consequently, mere compliance with proper procedures would not
make valid an amendment that conflicted with other clauses or with
the spirit of the Constitution.
In a long and scholarly opinion, Judge Hidayatullah traced the
history of India's nationalist movement since 1885, and showed that
it had been a struggle throughout for human rights, a struggle not
against British rulers alone but against all oppressors and all
oppressions. Mr. Hidayatullah relied heavily upon the views of
Jawaharlal Nehru in his discussion. Constitutions of many nations
came under an intensive review, including our own nation's
document which makes ill-considered amendments reasonably
difficult to enact,' 5 as well as the evanescent British Constitution
which has no document but derives stability from the immemorial
customs sanctified by centuries. Each of these constitutions,
however, as Mr. Hidayatullah pointed out, was a unique document
which could be properly understood only upon an historical
examination of the milieu in which each document was forged.
In India, in the light of such an examination, the Fundamental
Rights emerge as paramount, even transcendent. Judge
Hidayatullah regretted that the Fundamental Right involved in
Golaknath happened to be a property right, because he thought that
13. 1967 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1643, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.
14. [1967] 2 S.C.R. at 855.
15. For a masterful study of limits on substantive amendments to the United States
Constitution under Article V, see Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?,
23 ARIZ. L. REv. 717-33 (1981).
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property rights should never have been included in the list. 16 But the
list had to be accepted in its entirety. The main thrust of the list was
in harmony with the unanimous Declaration of Human Rights by
the General Assembly of the United Nations, issued just before the
establishment of India's independence. Such rights, Judge
Hidayatullah reasoned, could not be abridged, even by a unanimous
vote in both Houses, because the Indian Parliament has no
constituent power to rewrite or alter the very Constitution by and
under which Parliament is constituted. Viewing the Constitution,
then, in its totality, as forbidding changes in the Fundamental Rights
(other than the few changes expressly permitted 'by certain
constitutional clauses), the statement in the article on amendments
7
must be read as including an implied condition that the amendment
does not violate the letter or spirit of the Indian Constitution.
As for the earlier amendments which had been wrongly
adopted, Judge Hidayatullah did not now impugn their validity,
because they had been so long and so confidently accepted. He was
apparently recognizing what British constitutional lawyers must
believe; namely, that the legitimation of legal rules is largely a
function of societal recognition of those rules as proper guides for
conduct.
The Twenty-fourth Amendment (1971) purported to reverse the
holding of Golaknath that no Fundamental Right could be infringed
by a law of Parliament. Two years after that amendment, however,
the Supreme Court, while agreeing that the Fundamental Rights
were not sacrosanct, simultaneously rescued and enormously
broadened Golaknath. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Karala, 8
the Court announced, seven votes to six, a broader, though much
vaguer, test: no constitutional amendment can be validly made
which alters the "basic structure" of the Constitution.
In 1975, early in Mrs. Gandhi's term as Prime Minister, the
Thirty-ninth Amendment sought to withdraw litigation over the
validity of her election as Prime Minister from the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. The Court decided, on the facts, that the election
was valid, but elaborating on the holding in Kesavananda, it
16. One should recall our own courts' struggles with the property aspects of "due
process of law." It may be interesting to note that in the recent preparation of Canada's
Constitution Act 1982, attempts to insert an explicit protection for property rights failed.
The question remains, however, whether such protection is implied. See A. Aggarwal,
Fundamental Rights in the New Canadian Constitution: A Charter of New Hopes and
New Directions 23-28 and n.58 (Confederation College, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada
1982) (unpublish manuscript, available in office of Cornell International Law Journal).
17. Namely, that mere adherence to the stipulated procedures would produce valid
amendments to the Constitution.
18. 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1.
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nonetheless rejected the amendment. 19
The Forty-second Amendment (1976) was a drastic and
sweeping attempt to revise the Constitution so as to strengthen Mrs.
Gandhi's rule. The battered Constitution was partially resuscitated
by the Forty-third (1977) and Forty-fourth (1978) Amendments, as
Mrs. Gandhi temporarily fell from power.20 But the amendments
continue, and they purport to deny the courts the power to question
and limit the legislature, and the courts continue to assert their
constitutional power to do so. Although the depredations and the
tug-of-war probably will continue, I suggest that the power of the
courts to review such legislation will prevail over these efforts to
limit the proper constitutional role of the judiciary.
I hope, fervently, that the people of India may some day win to
the vision held out to them by the "sublime part" of the
Constitution.2' The Indian people are not docile, and they know
what they want. Admittedly, they are a diverse and inconstant
people, forty percent illiterate and caste- and tradition-ridden, and
yet they have confounded their skeptics again and again with their
commitment to a democratic rule of law. The Thirty-ninth and
Forty-second Amendments have certainly demonstrated that Mr.
Hidayatullah's fears regarding an unrestricted Parliamentary power
to amend the Constitution were not hobgoblins, but were fears well-
founded. One can only hope that Mr. Hidayatullah's views
concerning constitutional change will receive the continued support
of the Indian people and Parliament.
22
19. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 A.I.R. (S.C.) 229; [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347.
20. See, e.g., K.P. CHAKRAVARTI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA; ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 498-99 (1980).
21. Id. at 21-23. Mr. Chakaravarti thus characterizes the Preamble, the
Fundamental Rights, and the Directive Principles, provisions promoting secularism,
establishing a socialistic pattern of society, and fostering respect for international law and
order.
22. In the United States, we are better protected from hasty amendments to our
Constitution than are the Indian people. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 15. But we are not
immune from such actions, and pressures appear to be mounting on a variety of fronts.
For example, the Congress has considered spending less money for the protection of
constitutional rights. It also has considered limiting the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts. I suspect that our courts would hold such efforts invalid, because inaction, of
course, can be as unconstitutional as proscribed action, e.g., the discriminatory
nonadmission of a student to a college. If these legislative actions ever occur, the basic
reasoning of Judge Hidayatullah's pioneering opinion in Golaknath may prove to be as
helpful to us as it has been to India.
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